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Abstract 
 
This paper documents that law affects finance in emerging markets through the methods used by 
controlling shareholders to “tunnel” wealth out of the firm.  We find that Bulgarian securities law 
enabled financial tunneling via dilution and freeze-out tender offers. During the period 1999-
2001, about two-thirds of the 1,040 firms on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange were delisted.   
Freeze-out tender offers for minority shares averaged about 25% of the shares’ intrinsic value.  
Bulgarian securities law changes in 2002 made financial tunneling more costly for controlling 
shareholders.  Subsequent increases in stock market valuations and liquidity suggest that 
controlling shareholders have shifted from financial tunneling to less value-destroying methods, 
such as transfer pricing, to extract wealth from firms.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Black (2001) argue that the legal environment is a significant 
factor in explaining capital market development across countries.  In economies where securities 
laws offer investors better protection, stock markets tend to be more liquid and companies 
finance their projects through public issuance of securities.  In contrast, countries with poor legal 
protections tend to have illiquid markets and concentrated ownership structure.  Since the 
development of securities laws and regulations generally strains to keep pace with mass 
privatization (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2003), emerging markets often exhibit illiquidity and 
concentrated ownership.   
The research implies that securities law can have a dramatic impact on capital market 
development in emerging markets, and our paper sets out to study this proposition.  While the 
impact of legal structures on finance in emerging markets has been demonstrated in studies at the 
macroeconomy level (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), there 
has been little empirical research on the specific mechanisms that link law and finance in 
emerging markets.   
    An important means by which law can affect finance, as argued by Johnson et al. 
(2000), is that inadequate securities laws can enable large shareholders to “tunnel” (expropriate) 
minority shareholders’ wealth.  Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that tunneling can occur via both 
“financial” and “operational” mechanisms.  Financial tunneling involves transactions such as 
secondary offerings to dilute ownership and subsequent below-market-value “freeze-out” tender 
offers.  Operational tunneling is accomplished through accounting-related activities like transfer 
pricing, excess compensation, or revaluation of assets. Our paper extends the pioneering study of 
Johnson et al. (2000) by showing that changes in the law affect the choice of tunneling method, 
which in turn impacts finance (the capital markets). 
Gilson and Gordon (2003) assert that financial tunneling via minority freeze-out is the 
most value-destroying type of wealth expropriation, as future increases in firm value are not 
shared with minority owners.  Among emerging markets, freeze-outs tend to be more common 
when there has been a mass privatization “Big Bang,” such as in Czechoslovakia and Russia 
(Glaeser et al., 2001).  Gilson and Gordon (2003) also argue that if laws make financial tunneling 
more costly or less beneficial, controlling shareholders will rationally shift to operational   2
methods.  So the legal environment not only affects the extent of tunneling, it also influences the 
method of tunneling. 
We use the creation and early years of the Bulgarian stock market to investigate the 
relationship between law and tunneling.  We document the weaknesses in the initial Bulgarian 
securities laws related to equity value appraisal and preemptive rights.  As a result of gaps in the 
initial laws, most tunneling in Bulgaria prior to the end of 2001 is financial tunneling, 
accomplished mainly via dilution and minority freeze-outs.  Detailed trade, price, and ownership 
data reveal how freeze-outs actually affect market valuations in this emerging market.  During 
the period 2000-2001, over two-thirds of all companies on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange were 
delisted, with valuations dropping dramatically and liquidity virtually disappearing.  
Financial tunneling is also related to firm-level characteristics.  Relative to surviving 
firms, freeze-out firms tend to be smaller in size and less oriented toward exports, and to have a 
smaller proportion of ownership by government-backed shareholders.  Once a non-government 
majority shareholder gains control, a freeze-out becomes much more likely. These findings 
suggest that tunneling in emerging markets is also affected by governance mechanisms like 
reputation or ownership structure. 
Consistent with the goals of self-enforcing corporate law as discussed by Black and 
Kraakman (1996), legal changes in 2002 filled in the gaps in Bulgarian securities law that had 
led to mass freeze-outs.  We use this natural experiment to examine the assertion of Gilson and 
Gordon (2003) about shifts between tunneling methods.  Consistent with their arguments, 
financial tunneling via dilution and freeze-out becomes virtually nonexistent after the legal 
changes.  Buyouts of minority shareholders that do occur are at premiums consistent with those 
in developed markets (DeAngelo et al., 1984), instead of the 70-80% discounts that had existed 
prior to the legal changes. 
After financial tunneling is made more difficult, liquidity in the Bulgarian market 
improves and valuation levels rise.  This is consistent with controlling shareholders rationally 
switching to operational tunneling methods like transfer pricing with controlled subsidiaries, 
which are less value-destructive.  Operational tunneling, while still costly to minority 
shareholders, nonetheless permits them to continue to share in the firm’s future cash flows.  This 
finding supports the Gilson and Gordon (2003) notion that financial tunneling methods are the 
most destructive, especially in an emerging market.    3
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some additional 
background on the applicable literature, as well as details on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange and 
Bulgarian securities law.  Section 3 describes the data.  The results and discussion are in Section 
4.  Section 5 discusses the change from financial to operational tunneling motivated by the 2002 
legal changes. Section 6 summarizes the findings and offers conclusions. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1. Law and finance in emerging markets  
La Porta et al. (1998) examine the relationship between the legal environment and the 
development of capital markets.  Building on their work, subsequent studies have related the 
level of investor protection across countries to measures of firm valuation, ownership structure, 
or required dividend payments.
1  In these studies, legal protection tends to be measured as an 
aggregate index of various protections and rights (La Porta et al. 1998).  Countries with stronger 
protection and shareholder rights tend to have more liquid markets and less ownership 
concentration.
2 
Far less research has addressed the impact of particular legal statutes and their effect on 
capital market development in emerging economies.  Black (2001) provides a list of legal 
provisions that should be included in any corporate regulatory environment to facilitate the 
development of a liquid public equity market.  There are also several studies in the law and 
finance literature that provide case study evidence of how minority shareholder wealth can be 
expropriated in countries with poor investor protection; notable examples are Johnson et al. 
(2000) and Black et al. (2000).  But these studies do not provide any systematic empirical 
analysis of the effects of changes in securities law on market development.  Nor do they address 
the impact of the presence or absence of specific legal protections enumerated by Black (2001).  
Changes in securities laws should have an impact on the valuation of firm equity, 
especially if the law tends to lag capital market development (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2003).   
However, this linkage has not been extensively studied in emerging markets. One exception is 
Nenova (2002), who examines the impact of changing protections for minority shareholders in 
                                                 
1 See Denis and McConnell (2002) for a survey of this extensive literature 
2 See Ciccotello and Muscarella (2001) for similar results for master limited partnerships in the United States.   4
dual-class share firms in Brazil.  She finds that the value of corporate control responds to 
adjustments in regulations to protect minority shareholder rights.   
Dzierzanowski and Tamowicz (2002) argue that minority shareholder rights are the key 
to market confidence.  Protecting minority shareholder against freeze-outs is a particularly 
important legal protection discussed by Gilson and Gordon (2003) and Black (2001).  Johnson et 
al. (2000) explicitly refer to freeze-outs as “financial tunneling.”  Freeze-outs generally take 
place via dilution of minority ownership, with a subsequent buyout of shares at a low price.  
Depending on the degree of legal protection, a buyout can generate entirely different outcomes 
for minority shareholders.  In the United States, DeAngelo et al. (1984) document average 
premiums in going-private transactions of more than 50% above share market equity value.  In 
the early stages of the Bulgarian market, minority shareholders were often frozen out at huge 
discounts (70-80%) to the intrinsic value of their shares.   
Managers can also tunnel wealth out of the firm in ways other than by dilution or freeze-
out of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000).  If financial tunneling methods such as a 
discounted tender offer would generate large legal or political costs, controlling shareholders 
might choose to engage in subtler, “operational” forms of wealth transfer.  In an ongoing 
business, operational tunneling is possible through the payment of excessive wages and benefits, 
or through transfer pricing that favors suppliers or customers in which the majority owner also 
has an interest (Cheung et al., 2004).  Although less dramatic than a tender offer, operational 
tunneling can transfer significant wealth over time.  
  The choice between operational and financial tunneling could be influenced by the 
existing legal regulatory framework.  If one tunneling method is made more costly by regulation, 
controlling shareholders might rationally switch to another method.  Even developed markets 
struggle to find the proper regulatory balance.  With the recent accounting scandals in the United 
States, the regulatory emphasis has shifted toward reducing operational tunneling.  This arguably 
makes financial tunneling (e.g., going private) a more attractive option for controlling 
shareholders (Pritchard, 2004).  Consistent with arguments about switching tunneling regimes, 
Gilson and Gordon (2003) argue that recent developments in Delaware corporate law encourage 
financial tunneling through minority freeze-outs.  Table 1 summarizes the recent research on 
tunneling and describes the methods used in Bulgaria.   5
While data permitting an examination of tunneling in developed markets is generally 
available, there has been little empirical research on controlling shareholders’ choice of 
tunneling methods in emerging markets.  To examine this issue requires firm-level stock 
ownership, price, and accounting data. Bulgaria provides an interesting opportunity to study the 
interaction of law, tunneling, and stock market valuation.  Not only have the 2002 changes in law 
against dilution and freeze-out been so dramatic that the shift from financial tunneling methods is 
discernible, but we also have access to detailed data that allow us to document the 
implementation of tunneling methods and examine their effect on equity values.   
Even if the lack of legal protections for minority shareholders makes freeze-outs possible, 
the majority shareholders in some firms might choose not to expropriate minority shareholders’ 
wealth.  Black (2001) refers to this behavior as motivated by a “concern for reputation.”  Black 
and Kraakman (1996) argue that in emerging markets, reputation generally would be less 
important than corporation law.  Rational controlling shareholders or managers balance the 
benefits and costs of expropriation.  When concerns about future business prospects, the success 
of future public offerings, or political costs make the costs of expropriation high, there is a 
greater chance that self-governance will complement the explicit control mechanisms contained 
in the law.   
2.2. Law and tunneling in the Bulgarian stock market 
2.2.1. Laws on freeze-outs 
Prior to 2002, weak preemptive rights (the legal right of existing shareholders to participate in 
new equity issues in proportion to their ownership stake) in Bulgarian corporate law allowed 
majority shareholders to increase their capital unilaterally.  The lack of preemptive rights is not 
unusual — LaPorta et al. (1998) find that only 53% of the countries in their worldwide sample 
have preemptive rights.  Bulgarian securities law also allowed a majority shareholder to take a 
company private by making a tender offer for the shares of the remaining shareholders. The 
minimum price that the majority shareholder had to pay for the minority shares was the 
weighted-average stock price for the last three months of trading on the Bulgarian Stock 
Exchange (BSE).
3 
                                                 
3 Article 150, point 6, of the 1999 Law on Public Offering of Securities.   6
The combination of these provisions created a roadmap for expropriation.  Suppose that a 
minority stake had already been diluted through additional purchases of shares by majority 
holders.  At that point, the market for minority shares would likely be thin because the shares 
would face a steep control discount.  The majority shareholder could then arrange for several 
large block transactions with related parties at low prices.  The resulting weighted-average stock 
price (which forms the minimum price for the tender offer) is thus brought down to an arbitrarily 
low level.  As a result of dilution and efforts to drive down the tender offer price, minority shares 
could be bought back at prices well below their intrinsic value.
4   
  Once controlling shareholders had acquired most of the minority shares in a tender offer 
and obtained the formal approval of the Bulgarian State Security and Exchange Commission, the 
firm would be delisted from the Bulgarian Stock Exchange. Over the period 1998-2001, nearly 
two-thirds of the firms on the exchange were delisted. 
2.2.2. Changes in securities laws 
In the summer of 2001, a newly elected government headed by the former Bulgarian king 
came into power. One of the priorities outlined by the new government was to improve the 
functioning of the capital markets. As a first step, in late 2001 the government proposed several 
changes to the securities laws.  Table 2 summarizes these changes, which were authorized by the 
Bulgarian Parliament in early 2002.  
The first of the two main changes was that an increase in firm equity could be 
implemented only through mandatory issuance of warrants to all shareholders. These warrants 
had to be listed on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange and publicly traded. As a result of this change, 
majority owners could no longer unilaterally increase their capital by relying on the lack of 
participation of minority shareholders in new equity issues.  Majority shareholders would have to 
purchase warrants from the remaining shareholders and thus compensate them for any dilution of 
ownership rights. 
The second major change was the regulation of tender offers in going-private 
transactions.  The law now recognizes three critical ownership levels: 50%, 67%, and 90%.  A 
tender offer is mandatory when a shareholder reaches one of these critical levels, and a 
                                                 
4 Relying on a three-month average of market prices would appear to be a reasonable control mechanism.  But 
market failure highlights the weakness in the law.  Black and Kraakman (1996) discuss how the weakness of other 
control mechanisms, such as the market, can impact governance in an emerging market.    7
controlling shareholder can delist a company only when reaching 90% ownership or greater.  
The law also gives veto power to minority shareholders regarding the terms of the mandatory 
tender offer.  More than half of all shareholders, besides the majority owner, now have to 
approve the terms of the tender offer. Finally, minority shareholders are now entitled to receive a 
fair price for their shares in a tender offer. The fair price is calculated using discounted cash flow 
and relative valuation methods and is compared to the three-month average stock market price, 
excluding block trades. The tender offer price should be the higher of the two prices.  
These changes echo the spirit of Black and Kraakman’s (1996) construction of self-
enforcing corporate law in emerging economies.  Self-enforcing laws would tend to require 
direct approval by minority shareholders rather than relying on a market mechanism (appraised 
values based on average stock prices).  The analysis in this paper provides a direct empirical test 
of the impact of moving from a market mechanism to a self-enforcing legal mechanism for 
appraisal values.    
3. Data 
3.1. Sources 
  The list of all Bulgarian companies that have ever been publicly traded, the date of their 
listing on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE), and the date of their delisting (if any) are 
obtained from the online database provided by the Bulgarian Securities and Stock Exchange 
Commission (SSEC).  The majority of publicly traded companies on the BSE, a total of 1,040 
firms, are companies that participated in the Bulgarian mass privatization process and were listed 
on the exchange in May 1998. Atanasov (2004) or Miller and Petranov (2000) provide more 
details about the Bulgarian mass privatization process. Trade and price data are compiled directly 
from the BSE tapes. Company financials are provided by the SSEC and the Center for Mass 
Privatization.  Tender offer prices are collected from the news tapes recorded by the BSE.  
Ownership levels and the number of outstanding shares at year-end for each listed 
company are provided by the Bulgarian Central Depository, which records all trades in listed 
securities and keeps all individual accounts of security ownership in Bulgaria. Since no bearer 
shares exist in Bulgaria, the Central Depository is the ultimate source of ownership data for 
Bulgarian publicly traded companies.   8
3.2. Descriptive 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the period from May 1998 to December 
2002.  The average monthly volume (in Bulgarian levs) decreases during the period1999-2001, 
and then sharply increases in 2002 after implementation of the new regulations.  The number of 
issues on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange declines steadily from 1,040 firms in May 1998 to 325 
at the end of 2002.  The most noticeable drop, however, is between December 1999 and 
December 2000.  The reduction in listed firms is due to widespread freeze-out of minority 
shareholders. 
Our BSE trade data cover all trades on the stock exchange in the period between January 
1998 and December 2002. A total of 80,000 trades were executed during that period in the shares 
of 910 different securities. The market is thin, however, with an average of fewer than 100 trades 
per security for the whole period. 
Table 4 provides evidence on the liquidity of firms on the BSE.  Firms in which the 
government retains a majority stake are the most liquid, as measured by the average number of 
trades per year.  Firms with large non-government owners have only about one-fifth the trades of 
the government-owned firms, on average.  Also apparent is the downward trend in trading.   
Liquidity is highest in 1998 for four of the five firm ownership types shown.  At the beginning of 
trading in 1998, blocks of shares change hands while large and/or majority ownership stakes are 
being accumulated.  In 2000 and 2001, trading drops off by more than 50% in several types of 
firms.  Even among firms with only small owners, liquidity dries up.  Trading rebounds for every 
type of firm in 2002 after the changes in the securities laws.  For firms with a majority owner, 
trading increases by nearly 50% from 2001 to 2002. 
4.  Results 
  This section describes and discusses the stock ownership and market data surrounding the 
delisting of firms on the BSE.  The first subsection presents an analysis of delisted firms and the 
determinants of delisting.  The second subsection examines the process by which ownership is 
diluted.  The last sub-section analyzes the impact of changes in laws and regulations in 2002. 
 
4.1. Delisted Firms   9
We begin the data analysis by examining a random sample of 100 firms delisted in the 
year 2000.  Our goal is to analyze the terms of delisting deals done before the 2002 changes in 
securities laws.  Table 5 shows that in the sample of 100 delisted firms, the average ownership of 
the largest shareholder is exactly equal to the minimum stake required to obtain absolute control. 
In more than half of the sample firms, the largest block is clustered around 50% of firm equity. 
This suggests that in most of the sample companies, the majority owners did not even bother 
with secondary offerings to dilute minority shareholders’ stake below 50% before launching the 
freeze-out tender offer.  
Table 6 shows a descriptive summary of all delisted firms covered by the SSEC (a total 
of 840 firms) by ownership classification as of the point when the firm initially traded.  Across 
all categories of ownership, delisted firms are smaller, suggesting that firm size matters.  Most of 
the firms in the sample have one (or more) large owner, government or otherwise. Only 66 out of 
the 840 have an unclaimed majority block at the end of the privatization auctions and the 
beginning of trading.  In most of these 66, a majority owner eventually emerges through trading 
on the BSE. 
Both Table 5 and Table 6 show that a dispersed ownership structure was unlikely to 
persist in Bulgaria during the 1998-2001 timeframe.  There were strong incentives for large (and 
majority) shareholders to emerge and buy out the minority at a deep discount.  The legal 
environment permitted concentration of ownership, as well as tender offers at low prices.  This is 
unlike other emerging markets (such as China) that prohibited non-government ownership 
concentration (Chau et al., 1999).   
Table 7 examines the delisting phenomenon in a multivariate context for the 840 firms.  
Consistent with Table 6, firm size strongly negatively affects the probability of delisting. The 
percentage of export sales is also negatively associated with the probability of delisting.  On the 
basis of industry classifications used by the Center for Mass Privatization, there is no 
relationship between industry and the likelihood of delisting.   
Table 7 shows that government control after privatization also negatively affects the 
probability of delisting.  This government ownership result parallels the finding in Table 6 that 
only 43% of the government-controlled firms were delisted, compared to 73% for the sample as 
a whole.  Together, the export sales and government ownership results are consistent with the 
conjecture that controlling shareholders balance the costs and benefits of financial tunneling   10
(Black, 2000).  Ownership changes in firms with greater exports potentially affect more entities 
outside Bulgaria, and might generate international attention.  Such attention could raise the 
profile of the freeze-out issue domestically.  Similarly, firms under government control could 
face greater political challenges if they attempt to go private via freeze-out.  Perhaps there were 
considerations in certain cases that offset the potential for rapid profit at the expense of minority 
shareholders.   
The results suggest an interesting tradeoff for minority shareholders in a firm with the 
government as a controlling shareholder.  On one hand, significant government ownership could 
lead to high agency costs if the government is a poor monitor.  This could manifest itself in 
operational tunneling through suboptimal transfer pricing policies, inadequate performance 
evaluation, and so on.  On the other hand, the government’s presence reduces the probability of 
catastrophic wealth loss for minority shareholders via financial tunneling (freeze-out).  In the 
early stages of the Bulgarian market, it appears that the benefits of government majority 
ownership outweighed the costs.
5   
The existence of a strong owner (more than 25% of equity and no other large owners) 
positively affects the probability of delisting, but this variable is negatively correlated with the 
government’s retaining a majority stake.  Recall from Table 6 that only 66 firms have no large 
owners after privatization.  Regardless, the finding suggests that a large owner increases the odds 
of delisting. The positive effect of a controlling blockholder on the probability of delisting is 
consistent with a result in Atanasov (2004), who shows that the existence of a controlling 
blockholder is associated with a 40-60% discount in firm market value.  
Table 8 shows the relationship between liquidity (as measured by number of trades), 
ownership structure, and delisting.  Firms that are eventually delisted have significantly lower 
liquidity even after controlling for firm size, export sales, and ownership structure.  If the number 
of trades proxies for the willingness of small investors to buy and sell shares of particular firms, 
then this result suggests that small shareholders correctly predict the intentions of large (or 
majority) owners regarding expropriation.   
4.2. Financial tunneling mechanisms—dilution and tender offers  
                                                 
5 We are grateful to Cliff Holderness for this observation.   11
Table 5 shows that 13% of the sample firms have at least one trade in a three-month 
window before their delisting.  These tend to be the largest and most liquid firms in the sample. 
Their relatively higher liquidity implies that these firms were more visible to the public and seen 
as better investments for minority owners.  To delist these companies, the controlling 
blockholders took advantage of the “old” securities laws.  One common freeze-out strategy was 
to make a secondary offering to dilute the minority shareholders’ stake.  To further drive down 
prices in companies that traded frequently, majority owners often engaged in block trades with 
related parties prior to the tender offer.  
Table 9 provides five examples of this type of trading.  The table illustrates situations in 
which possible manipulative trading reduced the weighted-average stock price in the three 
months before delisting. This three-month average price is the minimum tender offer price for 
minority shares under the provisions of the pre-2002 securities law.  If the midpoint of the 
trading range for the six months before the large (or block) trade is the basis, then large trades 
are done at an average discount of approximately 75% for the five cases shown.  The size of the 
large (block) trades is between 50 and 170 times the average trade size for the prior period.  
Already subject to a deep minority discount, the shares of the five companies in Table 9 have 
very little liquidity in the three months prior to the large trades, with an average of fewer than ten 
trades per company.  These block trades would drive the average price calculation.  Delisting 
occurs within three months in each case and sometimes within days of the large trades. 
Table 9 provides a rare glimpse of market manipulation of the appraisal price in a tender 
offer (Hermalin and Schwartz, 1996).  In the case of Bulgarian tender offers, awarding the pre-
freeze-out market price to minority shareholders would have left them with less than intrinsic 
value due to manipulation of thinly traded positions.  The results thus reflect the danger of 
relying solely on the market to determine appraisal values in an emerging economy (Black and 
Kraakman, 1996).  
Table 10 provides a broader-based empirical analysis of dilution in the Bulgarian market.  
We develop a measure of dilution that is illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a 
firm has 1,000 shares, with a majority shareholder owning 500 of the shares and the remainder 
distributed among small investors. The majority shareholder issues 9,000 new shares and then 
purchases all of them. This nine-fold increase in shares results in a majority block increase from 
50% to 95%, while the minority block drops from 50% to 5%. Let us define minority   12
shareholder dilution as the ratio of the change in minority ownership (or one minus the majority 
block) from the year before the secondary share issue to the year after and the minority 
ownership in the year after. Minority shareholder dilution in our example equals ((1 – 0.5) – (1 – 
0.95)) / (1 – 0.95) = 9.  If we then define the equity increase as the percentage increase in the 
total number of shares from the year before the secondary issue to the year after, then the equity 
increase in our example will equal (10,000 –1,000) / 1,000 = 9.  By construction, minority 
shareholder dilution will always equal the equity increase for any secondary offer if the majority 
shareholder purchases all newly-issued shares. In contrast, if all shareholders participate pro rata 
in a secondary offer, then minority dilution will equal zero.  A regression of our dilution measure 
on the equity increase thus provides an empirical assessment of shareholder dilution from 
secondary equity offers. A coefficient of one on equity increase is evidence of complete minority 
dilution, while a coefficient of zero suggests no minority shareholder dilution. 
Table 10 reports the results from the estimation of such a regression for each year 
between 1999 and 2003. The results are striking. The coefficient on equity increase is 0.916 for 
the year 2000.  The R-squared in 2000 is 84%. This suggests that during the period of 
widespread delisting, secondary equity issues severely diluted minority interests.  Prior to 
changes in the legal regime, secondary issues were arguably used only for dilution.  Very few 
minority shareholders participated.  
4.3. Impact of changes in laws and regulations  
Table 10 shows a striking change in the dilution of secondary offers following the legal 
changes in 2002.  In 2002 and 2003, the coefficients on equity increase are 0.12 and 0.02, 
respectively. Moreover, there are only eight large (more than 20%) equity increases in 2002 and 
16 in 2003 and the R-squared drops to virtually zero. These results suggest that the 2002 changes 
in the law, which provided for the mandatory issue of warrants in a secondary offer, have been 
extremely successful in curbing minority shareholder dilution via secondary equity issuances.   
Following the legal changes, there were also significant differences in tender offer 
premiums.  Table 11 provides data for the 23 tender offers made since the changes in securities 
laws in December 2001.  Unlike the tender offers over the period 1998-2001, which occurred at 
large discounts to intrinsic value, offers after the legal changes show a premium, on average.  
The magnitude of the change caused by the newly instituted legal protections is striking; the   13
premium is about 38% for initial offers and over 54% for final offers.  More than 20% of the 
offers are revised upwards to secure minority shareholder agreement and the approval of the 
SSEC of the tender offer price. 
The premiums following the changes in securities law in Bulgaria are very close to those 
found in DeAngelo et al. (1984) for going-private transactions in the U.S.  As in the U.S., 
minority shareholders in Bulgaria can now veto the tender offer and put the majority into a 
bilateral monopoly with them over control rights (DeAngelo et al., 1984). Furthermore, even if 
minority shareholders are passive, the Bulgarian securities regulator has to approve all tender 
offer prices and frequently requires their upward revision. 
Table 12 further shows the effectiveness of the 2002 legal changes in restoring investor 
confidence and equity values through a firm fixed-effect regression of quarterly P/E ratios on a 
before-after law change dummy. In all specifications the increase in P/E ratios after the legal 
changes, as measured by the coefficient on the dummy, is statistically and economically 
significant. For example, the conditional difference of P/E ratios between 2000 and 2002 
captured by the dummy in Model 1 is 5.59. This is almost a 100% increase over the average P/E 
ratio for 2000 of 5.9. 
The change in the overall valuations of the BSE is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows 
the BSE SOFIX index hitting a bottom in mid-2001.  The rise since the passage of the new laws 
in early 2002 has been significant.  By the end of 2003, the index value was nearly six times its 
value in mid-2001.  
 
 
5. Operational Tunneling  
  The 2002 changes in Bulgarian securities law dealt quite successfully with freeze-outs 
and dilution—two effective methods of financial tunneling. However, the law did not address the 
second and more widespread form of tunneling, which is operational tunneling or what Johnson 
et al. (2000) label “self-dealing.” One of the most common methods of operational tunneling is 
through transfer pricing and other related-party transactions. 
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that transfer-pricing tunneling mechanisms became more 
prevalent after the legal changes in 2001. Most majority owners of Bulgarian firms were 
incorporated in offshore zones like Cyprus or the Cayman Islands. These zones were carefully   14
chosen because of tax treaties with Bulgaria that limit the tax on company profits to 5-15%.  
After incorporating in a zone with low corporate tax rates, the majority shareholder could charge 
the Bulgarian firm for outside services or the sale of intangible assets like technology or 
reputation.  In effect, cash from the Bulgarian firm was being tunneled to the offshore company.  
Other similar transactions involved sales of underpriced assets to fully owned subsidiaries, or 
revaluation of fixed assets to increase depreciation and show lower earnings per share.  
  Operational tunneling thus has two effects. The first is to reduce the taxable income of 
the Bulgarian firm, thereby reducing the income tax due.  The second effect is to reduce the 
wealth of minority owners and tunnel this wealth into the hands of the majority shareholder.  It is 
important to note that in the case of operational tunneling, the government tax authorities have 
exactly the same interests as the minority shareholders. Freeze-outs are an entirely tax-neutral 
event, and the government can protect minority shareholders only by invoking securities laws 
and imposing civic penalties for fraudulent behavior by controlling blockholders.  With transfer 
pricing and other forms of operational tunneling, however, the government can prosecute 
controlling owners under criminal law for tax evasion.  To avoid tax-related penalties, majority 
owners might limit themselves to tunneling relatively small amounts out of the firm in related-
party transactions.  
Operational tunneling through related-party transactions also has very different effects on 
the timing and sharing of monitoring and restructuring benefits. Gilson and Gordon (2003) stress 
this difference between freeze-outs and operational tunneling. If a freeze-out is possible, a 
majority shareholder has incentives to postpone any significant restructuring efforts until after 
taking the company private. The controlling blockholder even has incentives to destroy firm 
value or temporarily depress stock prices (as in Table 9). If freeze-outs at depressed prices are 
not allowed under the law and majority shareholders can extract private benefits of control only 
by operational tunneling (self-dealing), they still have incentives to restructure their companies, 
monitor managers, and invest in other activities that increase firm value. Some of these benefits 
will accrue to minority owners, as shown in theoretical models by Atanasov (2002) and Bebchuk 
and Jolls (1999).  
Operational tunneling might be more benign than financial tunneling for several sound 
reasons, but it is still tunneling.  Ironically, the recent situation in certain developed markets is 
the reverse of the Bulgarian scenario.  Efforts to curb operational tunneling methods like   15
excessive loans to insiders in the United States have led to additional laws and regulations 
affecting accounting and governance (for example, Sarbanes-Oxley).  Consistent with the 
Johnson et al. (2000) arguments, the higher cost of operational tunneling appears to be bringing 
financial tunneling back into vogue in the United States in the form of increased going-private 
activity (Pritchard, 2004; Subramanian, 2004; Bates et al., 2004).  
 
6.  Summary 
  This paper examines how law affects finance in an emerging market through its impact 
on tunneling.  We provide empirical evidence on the freeze-out of minority shareholders on the 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE).  Over the period 1999-2001, about two-thirds of the firms on 
the BSE were delisted following tender offers from majority shareholders.  Relying on detailed 
trade, price, and ownership data, we focus on the impact of provisions that permitted minority 
shareholders’ interests to be diluted and then purchased at deeply discounted prices via tender 
offer.  Unlike prior studies on emerging markets, which provide macro- (economy) level analysis 
or case study evidence of expropriation, we perform an empirical analysis on a sample of more 
than 1,000 companies. 
  Despite the existence of legal provisions that enabled freeze-outs, about one-third of the 
firms on the BSE were not delisted during the 1998-2001 period.  Firms that survived were 
relatively large in size, had greater percentages of export sales, and tended to have a higher 
percentage of government ownership.  This finding suggests that the presence of implicit control 
mechanisms, such as reputation or political cost, matters even in emerging markets. 
  Freeze-outs of minority shareholders became much more difficult after changes in 
Bulgarian securities laws in 2002.  Majority holders could no longer unilaterally issue 
themselves shares, and minority shareholders had strong appraisal rights in tender offer 
transactions.  Upon adoption of the changes, minority dilution via equity issuances has virtually 
disappeared, while tender offers (which had been occurring at a discount of about 75%) began to 
show an average premium of about 50%.  Initial tender offer bid premiums and revisions 
following the securities law changes in Bulgaria closely approximate those observed in 
developed markets such as the U.S.  (DeAngelo et al., 1984). 
  Our analysis thus sheds light on the costs and choices of tunneling behavior, with 
implications for both emerging and developed markets (Johnson et al., 2000).  In an emerging   16
market, however, protecting minority shareholders from financial tunneling with securities laws 
is critical due the weakness of other constraining mechanisms (Black and Kraakman, 1996).  
Consistent with these claims, we find that financial tunneling has a dramatic effect on stock 
market integrity and equity valuations.     17
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Table 1 
Tunneling Methods and Their Implementation in Bulgaria 
 
 
Tunneling Method  Research Studies  Implementation in Bulgaria 
 
1. Financial Tunneling    
Freeze-out Gilson  and Gordon (2003) 
Bates et al. (2004) 
Subramanian (2004) 
Tender offer close to three-month weighted-
average stock price. Often this price is 
manipulated with wash-out sales of stock 
shortly before tender offer. The price is 70%-
80% below the value of minority shares. 
Company is then delisted from the public 
register and minority shareholders receive 
little for their ownership stakes.  
Transfer of control via 
merger 
Gilson and Gordon (2003) 
 
N/A 
Dilution  Black and Kraakman (1996)  Majority shareholders initiate a large increase 
in equity capital at a price well below the 
current market price. The majority shareholder 
then makes the subscription process difficult 
for minority shareholders to participate in and 
buys all unsubscribed shares. The process 
results in a significant increase of the majority 
shareholder stake in the company at the 
expense of minority owners. 
2. Operational Tunneling    
Transfer pricing  Johnson et al. (2000)  Majority shareholders engage in transactions 
that favor suppliers or customers in which the 
majority owner also has an interest.   
Other non-arm’s-
length transactions 
 
Cheung et al. (2004)  Payment of excessive wages and benefits;  
earnings management; sale of intangibles at 
below market value to related parties. 
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Table 2 
Changes in Bulgarian Corporation Law in 2002 
 
 
Statute Pre-2002  2002 
 
Preemptive Rights  Minority shareholders can 
participate in new equity 
offerings. If they do not 
participate, the controlling 
shareholder can purchase all 
unsubscribed shares.  
Stock warrants are required to be issued upon 
every capital increase—one warrant for each 
share. The preemptive rights of shareholders 
in public companies can still be extinguished 
if not exercised within the period determined 
by a general meeting of shareholders.  This 
period cannot be less than one month from 
publication of the notice to subscribe shares in 
the State Gazette. The key difference is that 
shareholders can sell the warrants to other 
shareholders or third parties, as opposed to 
having to exercise their preemptive rights by 
buying the shares themselves.  Majority 
shareholders are now put in the position of 
having to purchase the warrants in order to 
increase proportional ownership, rather than 
just taking control of unsubscribed shares 
when the minority did not buy them.   
Appraisal Rights  In a going-private 
transaction, a controlling 
shareholder should offer at 
least the weighted-average 
stock price from the last 
three months of trading  
1. A controlling shareholder should extend a 
mandatory tender offer to remaining 
shareholders when reaching 50%, 67%, 
and 90% ownership in the firm. A 
controlling shareholder can initiate a 
going-private transaction only when 
reaching 90%. 
2. Minority shareholders should receive a fair 
price for their shares in tender offers and 
going-private transactions. A fair price is 
computed using discounted cash flow and 
comparable company multiples valuation 
methods and is compared to the average 
stock price for the last three months, 
excluding block trades. Minority 
shareholders should receive the higher of 
the two prices. 
3. A majority of minority shareholders has to 
approve going-private transactions. 
4. The SSEC has to evaluate the price in 
going-private transactions and approve 
tender offers only if they meet the “fair 
value” requirements. 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for the Bulgarian Stock Exchange* 
 
This table shows the number of firms trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange Free Market and the monthly 
volume for the periods listed. The volume numbers are in Bulgarian levs (BGN). One Bulgarian lev has a fixed 
exchange rate of one Deutsche Mark or between 1.8 and 2.2 U.S. dollars for the 1998-2002 period. 
 
Date  No. of Issues  Monthly Volume (BGN) 
May 1998   1,040   9,071,085 
December 1998   979   17,884,170 
December 1999   828   9,780,590 
December 2000   478   9,137,416 
December 2001   372   1,510,259 
December 2002   325   18,786,093 
 
*Source: Bulgarian Stock Exchange web site: http://www.bse-sofia.bg/   22
Table 4 
Average Number of Trades per Year for Different Types of Listed Firms 
 
Only firms that remain listed on the BSE through December 2002 are used in the computation of the average 
number of trades per year. Ownership structure is measured at the beginning of 1998. Large owners are owners of 
more than 25% of firm equity.  Small owners are owners of less than 25% of firm equity.  Majority owners own 
more than 50% of firm equity. 
 
 
Firm Type  1998  1999 2000 2001  2002
Government 
keeps control 
95.4   50.0   85.6   46.7    79.9  
Small owners  22.3   18.3   9.8   7.5   7.8  
Two large or 
two small 
owners 
19.3   8.3   4.2   7.8   9.7  
One large 
owner 
17.9   15.1   11.3   12.2    13.9  
One majority 
owner 
(coalition) 
19.7   20.7   6.2   15.9    22.5  
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Table 5 
Characteristics of a Sample of 100 Firm Delistings during the Year 2000 
 
A sample of 100 companies was randomly chosen from all companies that were delisted in 2000. Information on the 
nature of delisting (tender offer or shareholder assembly decision) and the ownership stake of the largest shareholder 
was acquired from the Central Depository Agency in Sofia, Bulgaria. The trade data are taken from the BSE tapes. 
Returns are computed using the last trading price of a delisted company as long as it is within three months before 
delisting as the final price, and the most recent trading price that is at least six months before delisting as the 
beginning price. The P-value for the hypothesis that the return is equal to zero is in parentheses. 
 
Characteristics Value
Average percent of equity owned by the 
largest shareholder 
50.44%
Minimum percent of equity owned by the 
largest shareholder 
20%
Maximum percent of equity owned by the 
largest shareholder 
95%
Percent of firms that have no trades within 
three months before delisting 
87%
Average return for the firms with at least 
one trade three months before delisting  
-0.1670
(0.0946)
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Table 6 
Characteristics of Mass Privatization Firms and Firm Delistings 
 
Of the original 1,040 privatized firms, 191 firms are not covered by the Bulgarian SEC. Nine additional firms are 
delisted due to bankruptcy or merger. The removal of 200 (191+9) firms reduces the sample to 840 firms. Firm size 
is measured by book value of equity (each firm was assigned a number of shares by the government before 
privatization, and all firms’ shares had the same book value, therefore size equals book value of equity). Ownership 
structure is measured at the beginning of 1998.  Large owners are owners of more than 25% of firm equity.  Small 
owners are owners of less than 25% of firm equity. Majority owners own more than 50% of firm equity. 
 
 
Firm Type  Number of 
Firms 
% Delisted  Average Size 
of Listed Firm 
Average Size 
of Delisted 
Firm 
Government 
keeps control 
167  0.43    1,101,727  375,175 
Small owners  66 0.68  147,028  36,045 
Two large or two 
small owners 
84 0.71     340,008  64,256 
One large owner  300  0.71    195,840  70,615 
One majority 
owner (coalition) 
223 0.73  272,419  65,772 
All  840  0.66 520,459 105,347 
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Table 7 
Logit Models of Firm Delistings 
 
Of the original 1,040 privatized firms, 191 firms are not covered by the Bulgarian SSEC. Nine additional firms are 
delisted due to bankruptcy or merger. The removal of 200 (191+9) firms reduces the sample to 840 firms. The 
dependent variable equals one if a firm is delisted in the period January 1998 to December 2002. Firmshr equals the 
number of shares that each firm was assigned by the government before privatization. All firms’ shares had the same 
book value therefore this variable equals book value of equity. Strongowner is a dummy equal to one if a firm has 
either a majority owner or an owner of more than 25% equity and no other large owners. Governmentowner is a 
dummy equal to one if a firm is more than 50% government owned after the mass privatization auctions. Exportsales 
equals the ratio of export sales to total sales for 1995. The logit models are estimated using maximum likelihood. P-
values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Firmshr - 2.0189 
(0.000) 
-1.8332 
(0.000) 
-1.8321 
(0.000) 
Strongowner 0.3484 
(0.031) 
n.a. 0.0774 
(0.709) 
Governmentowner n.a.  -0.6173 
(0.002) 
-0.5574 
(0.030) 
Exportsales -0.6731 
(0.015) 
-0.6122 
(0.028) 
-0.6114 
(0.028) 
Constant 0.9413 
(0.000) 
1.2397 
 (0.000) 
1.1793 
(0.000) 
  Number of obs  = 840 
LR chi2(2) = 94.49 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  = 0.0876 
Number of obs  = 840 
LR chi2(2) = 99.07 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  = 0.0918 
Number of obs  = 840 
LR chi2(2) = 99.21 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  = 0.0920 
   26
Table 8 
Determinants of Firm Liquidity 
 
Of the original 1,040 privatized firms, 191 firms are not covered by the Bulgarian SEC, and nine additional firms are 
delisted due to bankruptcy or merger. The removal of 200 (191+9) firms reduces the sample to 840 firms. The 
sample is further reduced to 744 firms because 96 firms either have no trades on the BSE or their firm names were 
not matched to tickers in the BSE data. The dependent variable is the log of average number of trades per year. 
Firmshr equals the number of shares that each firm was assigned by the government before privatization. 
Strongowner is a dummy equal to one if a firm has either a majority owner or an owner of more than 25% equity 
and no other large owners. Governmentowner is a dummy equal to one if a firm is more than 50% government 
owned after the mass privatization auctions. Exportsales equals the ratio of export sales to total sales for 1995. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Firmshr 0.4054 
(0.000) 
0.3803 
 (0.000) 
0.3803 
(0.000) 
Strongowner -0.2583 
(0.002) 
n.a. -0.0394 
(0.709) 
Governmentowner n.a.  0.4946 
 (0.000) 
0.4636 
(0.001) 
Exportsales 0.3965 
(0.005) 
0.3277 
(0.005) 
0.3262 
(0.022) 
Delisted -0.7916 
(0.000) 
-0.7472 
(0.000) 
-0.7471 
(0.000) 
Constant 1.8619 
(0.000) 
1.6666 
(0.000) 
1.7029 
(0.000) 
  Number of obs.  = 744 
F(4, 739) =  81.80 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
Adj R-squared =  0.3031 
Number of obs.  = 744 
F(4, 739) =  85.94 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
Adj R-squared =  0.3138 
Number of obs.  = 744 
F(5, 738) =  68.70 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
Adj R-squared =  0.3130 
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Table 9 
Examples of Possible Use of Large Trades to Reduce Delisting Price 
 
The examples are identified from the BSE tapes, by looking only at times when the last trade before delisting is 50 
or more times the average trade size for the year before delisting.  The price range is taken over the six months 
before the last trade.  
 
 
Firm Name  Range 
before 
trade 
Price of 
large 
trade 
Description Date  of  trade  Delisting 
date 
Plastimo, AD  5.00-5.00  1.00  One trade at 50 times 
average trade size 
4 April 2000  5 July 2000 
Preslav –AH, 
AD 
2.68-3.51  1.05  Two trades each of 100 
times average trade size 
12-19 May 2000  25 May 2000 
Sintermat, AD  11.99-13.00  2.50  Two trades of 65 times 
average trade size 
4-6 Oct 2000  29 Nov 2000 
Ropotamo, AD  13.66-20.70  1.12  One trade at 170 times 
average trade size 
9 Nov 2000  10 Jan 2001 
Loviko Chirpan, 
AD 
10.00-10.00  4.16  One trade at 56 times 
average trade size 
15 Mar 2000  8 June 2000 
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Table 10 
Dilution and Equity Issuance 
 
We define a minority shareholder dilution measure as ((1 - a1) - (1 - a2)) / (1 - a2), where a1 and a2 are the majority 
owner stakes before and after a secondary equity issuance, respectively. If a majority shareholder purchases all 
shares in a secondary equity issue, the dilution measure will be identical to the increase in equity capital. The 
increase in equity capital is measured as (E2-E1)/E1, where E2 and E1 are the number of shares at the end of year 2 
and year 1, respectively.  If the majority owner buys a proportionate stake in the secondary equity issue and minority 
shareholders participate proportionately, the dilution measure should be zero. The table below reports the results of a 
regression in which the dilution measure is the dependent variable and the equity increase is the independent 
variable. If there is full dilution, the coefficient on equity increase should be one. If there is no dilution, the 
coefficient should be zero.  The majority stakes and number of shares are measured at year-end. The data on number 
of shares outstanding and the size of controlling blocks are obtained from the Bulgarian Central Depository. The 
regressions include only observations where the number of shares has increased by more than 20% from one year to 
the next. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
  1999/1998 2000/1999 2001/2000 2002/2001 2003/2002
Coefficient on 
Equity Increase  
0.0490 
 (0.001) 
0.9156 
(0.000)
0.3032 
(0.085)
0.1195 
(0.610) 
0.0203 
(0.044)
Intercept 0.4479   
(0.029) 
-0.3694 
(0.132)
0.6714 
(0.515)
0.1177 
(0.840) 
-0.0375 
(0.785)
Number of 
Observations 
64 26 18 8 16
Adjusted R
2  0.1497 0.8431 0.1227 -0.1129 0.2061
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Table 11 
Characteristics of Tender Offers Announced After the 2001 Changes in Securities Law 
 
Tender offers are identified using keyword searches in the BSE news archive. The market price is computed as the 
equally weighted average stock price for the last three months before the announcement. Offers announced between 
July 2001 and December 2002 are included. The nine offers announced between July 2001 and December 2001 are 
considered because the government was discussing the law changes in Parliament during that period. Of the 27 
tender offers, two offer announcements have missing prices. Two other firms have no trades in the three months 
before the announcement. This reduces the sample to 23 observations. P-values for the hypothesis that the mean of 
the premium is zero are in parentheses. 
 
 
Characteristics Value
Number of tender offers  23
Average percent of equity sought  0.1314
Average premium to market price for initial 
tender offers 
0.3762 
(0.002)
Number of offer prices that are revised 
upwards 
6
Average increase of tender price of revised 
offers 
0.4655
(0.044)
Average premium for final offers  0.5477
 (0.001)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   30
Table 12 
Regression of P/E Ratios before and after Law Changes 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is P/E ratio computed as the equally weighted average stock price for each 
calendar quarter divided by the EPS for the previous year. Prices are obtained from the BSE trade tapes. Earnings 
per share are collected from annual financial statements available from the SSEC. Observations where EPS are 
negative or less than 0.01 Bulgarian lev are dropped. Only firms that have at least one non-missing P/E ratio before 
and after the law change are kept. Each regression includes firm-specific fixed effects. The post-law-change dummy 
in Model 1 equals one for calendar quarters in 2002 and zero for calendar quarters in 2000. The post-law-change 
dummy in Model 2 equals one for calendar quarters after September 30, 2001 and zero for quarters before. The post-
law-change dummy in Model 3 equals one for calendar quarters after December 31, 2001 and zero for quarters 
before. The post-law-change dummy in Model 4 equals one1 for calendar quarters after March 31, 2002 and zero for 
quarters before. P-values for the hypothesis that post-law-change dummies are equal to zero are in parentheses. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-law-change 
dummy 
5.5940 
(0.004)
4.9941
(0.007)
5.5350 
(0.016)
3.1449 
(0.143)
Average P/E when 
Post-law-change 
dummy equals 0 
5.9309 7.3341 8.7414 9.4167
Number of firm 
fixed effects 
35 79 62 68
Number of 
Observations 
217 541 458 477
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Figure 1. Performance of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange Index SOFIX in the period between October 2000 and October 2003.  
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